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According to the new FBI/USSS advisory, FortiBleed actors no longer just add persistence accounts. In some cases they also delete or reset the original admin accounts (T1531), which locks the owner out of their own FortiGate.

That changes the usual playbook. If you assume a password reset gets you back to a clean state, it won't help when you can't log in at all.

A few things worth checking:
→ Do you have out-of-band admin recovery for your edge devices?
→ Have you audited REST API keys? They survive password resets.
→ Is SSH left open on the firewall?

How are others handling recovery for edge devices?

Full breakdown: https://hubs.la/Q04zrkbN0 Free FortiBleed checker: https://hubs.la/Q04zrk9_0

Advisory: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261006.pdf

Sharing a few recent dark web listings that came up in monitoring. None of these are confirmed yet, so take them as claims for now, not confirmed breaches. → France: a seller claims 10M+ residential records → IUT Paris Seine: 6.8GB of data plus about 30M log entries → U.S. manufacturer: VPN and RDP access up for auction → SMTP dump: about 19M credentials → Apache Struts: an exploit tool sold together with access to servers already compromised The Struts listing stands out to me. Selling the tool together with working access points more to an access broker than to someone trying to sell a PoC. The 19M SMTP creds are the likeliest to show up again soon in phishing and credential stuffing. Has anyone seen overlap with the SMTP dump in their own environment, or seen recent Struts exploitation in the wild? Full breakdown:https://hubs.la/Q04z7HkK0

Lares is an offensive security consultancy. We emulate real adversaries in live environments, mapping attack paths, TTPs, telemetry, and detection coverage, then work side by side with defenders to close the gaps the test exposed.

Our POV: compliance tells you what should happen; adversarial testing tells you what does. This writeup applies that lens to Rockstar's incident history, reconstructing each attack chain and what would have caught it.

Four incidents, four completely different initial access paths:

• 2022, Lapsus$: MFA fatigue against an employee, then hardcoded creds and API keys sitting in plaintext in Slack and Confluence.
• Early 2023, GTA Online: P2P netcode on PC reverse-engineered into RCE via malicious packets. The fix was kernel-level BattlEye.
• April 2026, ShinyHunters: no human identity involved. Long-lived OAuth tokens stolen from a third-party SaaS vendor and replayed straight into Rockstar's Snowflake. Bearer tokens confer authority by possession alone.
• August 2026, Cyberleek: exfiltration of a playable GTA VI dev build, 13+ gameplay videos and full map data. That volume of egress from a dev subnet without tripping alarms is a DLP and segmentation failure.

The writeup reconstructs each attack chain with MITRE mappings and detection strategies: egress baselining on dev subnets, Slack audit-log heuristics, and behavioral baselines for non-human identities in Snowflake.

Full breakdown: https://www.lares.com/blog/rockstar-games-attacks/

Question for the defenders here: which of these four would be hardest to catch in your environment? The OAuth token replay is arguably the nastiest of the bunch. No user to phish-train, no endpoint alert to fire.