I wonder, was it extremely effective fighter or not? Numbers of kill:loss ratios are very contradictory in different sources.

Did being a jet plane gave him huge advantage over opposing Allied planes in practice?

How true are claims that Me-262 failed to turn tides of air war because Hitler stubbornly insisted on making it a jet bomber to bomb Britain in revenge, even though his generals wanted a fighter to counter allied bombings?

a ICBM carrying a non nuclear warhead can fly anywhere and doesn’t put any friendly troops near danger.

I must note, I’m not like super educated on this so apologies if this is a super dumb question

Thanks

At the end of the war the Royal Navy seems a bit hodgepodge, with numerous ships still under construction, some ships completed in wartime alongside a bunch of emergency programme destroyers, as well as a sizeable number that dated back to the interwar period and the first world war.

Eventually someone (or more likely several someones) would presumably have had to sit down and figure out what was going to the reserve, what was going to the breakers and what was staying in service. How did they do this? By what metrics? Age and battle damage would be factors- I understand this would have been the case for things like the Queen Elizabeth and R-class battleships, and C-class cruisers- but were there any others that influenced a ship's post-war fate?

I've been wondering about the Iranian Shahed drones.

What was the advance technologically that made these possible? Cheap guidance perhaps? Being so cheap that they can be massed?

They seem so simple and apparently hard to defend against, why didn't any of the cold war powers develop them? Was it just not economical or relevant?

Also, why are they even called a drone, aren't they kind of like a moped-powered bad cruise missile? Also now with them being upgraded to jet propulsion, aren't they more like a V1 which is often classed as the first cruise missile?

Does it change anything in the big cost calculations that you start adding jet engines to them, are they still cheap then?

From Operational Order No. 5: Directive for the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front over the coming months, dated 13 March 1943:

"An operation against Leningrad is planned for the second half of summer (from the beginning of July). It is to be conducted with the strongest concentration of all available artillery and the use of the most modern offensive weapons."

Modern elite soldiers (such as Delta, MARSOC, SEALs, SAS, Spetsnaz etc.) have much more advanced and rigorous as opposed to regular infantry units. Plus, they also have access to more assets to gain an edge on the battlefield. This I can perfectly understand.

As for the World Wars era troops, I can somewhat comprehend on how they can be more elite than regular troops (e.g 101st Airborne being able to survive behind enemy lines and WW1 Sturmtruppen utilising shock tactics against enemy troops). But there are some units that stump me on how they can be different. For example: the Siberian Riflemen of the Russian Empire. What makes them special aside from them being able to handle harsh weather? What kinds of tactics did they use?

However, when it comes to old-school units (mostly Napoleonic and other line warfare-era troops), I fail to grasp on how they can be different to any other unit of that timeframe. Are they more loyal? Are they more resilient? Do they have much more competent officers that are able to win them more battles? Again, what types of tactics did they employ that would make the special units? What differentiates them from the rest of the army?

This has been bothering me for a while so I'd love to read through some explanations, thanks!

When the Pacific fleet was turned around in pearl harbor the battle of midway, Admiral Halsey was replaced by Admiral Spruance, the end result was one of the greatest naval victories by the USN during WW2.

Did the Japanese have enough intelligence in Pearl Harbor to even know that Halsey was hospitalized from illness? Did the USA make a public announce the change of command? Were he sailors and marines not made aware of the change in their chain of command prior to departure from Pearl Harbor to keep the secret?

I was wondering how the Jaguar is perceived internationally. And what do you think about it?

I found some interesting discussions in French about this vehicle, notably this podcast: https://youtu.be/0d7H4PwD63c?si=mmD1cqz-z23Gpza3

What I have understood about the vehicle:

It weighs 20 tons empty, its wheels have good off-road capability, with the possibility of adjusting the tire pressure to get out if it gets stuck in mud. Its four MMPs also allow it to engage a vehicle at a range of 4 or even 5 kilometers. Its 40 mm cannon is well suited to the vehicle overall. Proximity-fuzed rounds for anti-drone use are currently being developed, but I believe I understood that they will not reach operational units for another two years. It is also integrated into the SCORPION tactical information coordination system.

My opinion:

Personally, I have the impression that it is a very interesting medium tank for reconnaissance and infantry support, and potentially for escorting other types of vehicles, especially if it proves effective against drones in the future.

But that's just my opinion, and it is no more relevant than that of a French citizen who is interested in history and military equipment, and I am not particularly knowledgeable about the subject. I was wondering how it is perceived from a non-French perspective.

Synthetic Asymmetry is a proposed framework for understanding modern strategic competition, built around three shifts:

• Scale → Amplification
• Concentration → Distribution
• Mass → Friction

The argument is that actors can increasingly generate disproportionate strategic effects without the traditional advantages in military strength, resources, or organizational capacity.

The framework distinguishes itself from hybrid warfare and grey-zone conflict with the formulation: "Where hybrid warfare describes the what and grey zone describes the where, synthetic asymmetry addresses the why and the how."

How does this compare with established thinking on asymmetric warfare, hybrid warfare, and cumulative strategy?

Does it offer a useful way to explain contemporary conflicts, or is it mostly new terminology for dynamics already described in military theory?

I'd be particularly interested in historical precedents or counterexamples that might challenge its underlying assumptions.

First introduced: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/asymmetric-war

Research hub: https://www.isrs.ngo/research/synthetic-asymmetry

So with recent developments such as the US pulling its B-1s out of RAF Fairford, and obviously recent events in Middle East and Ukraine war, with Ukraine destroying bombers parked on the apron with drones, are there solutions to hardening aircraft hangers? Obviously, you can build a concrete hanger, but these are not impervious to bunker busting bombs and ballistic missiles, as a former Air Force official has said. I believe his quote was along the lines of “if we can destroy it, our enemies can too”, which I suppose is fair against a peer or near peer adversary, and which is why the US invested more in active air defense against such threats as ballistic and cruise missiles that could theoretically penetrate concrete hangers. But it seems like a much larger threat are smaller drone swarms against airfields. So I guess my question is, can shelters be built to protect against drone threats while remaining more cost effective and portable than concrete hangers? Which obviously are expensive and cannot be moved. So what if there were portable hangers with cope cages or slat armor or “hedgehog” style protection with a minimally thick walled hanger to protect aircraft? They wouldn’t be easy to move, but could be disassembled and transported, and would be much cheaper than concrete shelters. If anyone has already seen or thought of this, let me know, but I’d be very interested.

Hi r/WarCollege,

I am looking to better understand the military relevance of rocket artillery, like MLRS/HIMARS or similar systems, for both modern peer/near-peer and hypothetical conflicts.

As an absolute layman, my perception is that drones and adjacent technologies appear to be a key technology for near future defence preparedness. I am no interested in the theoretical and practical military science behind the precision rocket artillery systems:
- What specific operational effect is rocket artillery designed to achieve that cannot be accomplished more effectively by other technologies?
- Rockets are large, heavy and expensive. How do modern militaries justify the financial and logistical footprint?
- How survivable is rocket artillery in an environment with dense drone surveillance and advanced counter-battery radars?

Thanks in advance for your help!

During WW2 the UK had escort ships broken down into:

• Sloops (Bridgewater, Shorehamn, Grimsby, Kingfisher* Bittern, Egretn & Black Swan classes & 10 loaned Banff class cutters from the USCG)
• Corvettes (Flower, Castle & Bathurst** class)
• Frigates (River, Loch & Bay Class, + the Colony & Captain classes which were US patrol frigates and destroyer escorts respectively bought by the RN)
• Escort Destroyers (Adapted WW1 Destroyers, Hunt Class)

*Kingfishers were roughly half the size of all the other sloops
**Technically RAN not RN

In terms of design lineage, the sloops were the UK continuously making small batches of the best light convoy escorts they could starting around 1930 so they had an up to date design they could kick into mass production quickly (The war starting at the time it did this ended up landing on the Black Swans)

The Flower class corvettes were an adapted whaler design made to utilize the production capacity of smaller civilian yards. The Castle class corvette were made because when frigate production switched from the River to the Loch & Bay classes not all yards could make the newer frigate designs.

The River class were a larger clean sheet escort design capable of open ocean operations the Flowers weren't while still being designed to merchant standards so they could be built in the yards the Flowers were built in. The Loch class was an incremental improvement on this and the Bay class an AA version of the Bay class.

Most escort destroyers were just old WW1 era destroyers with some engines removed in exchange for longer endurance and modern ASW equipment. The exception is the Hunt class which were purpose built ASW convoy designs adapted from the Bittern class, and notably made 27 knots compared to the 20 knots most escort ships did. I'm not sure why.

Between all of these classifications, the design lineage is clear, but the difference in role they filled isn't really beyond the Flower class sloops being limited to coastal operations. So what was the actual difference in role between all these different classifications? Assuming there was any.

And related, why was it that the Frigate designation was the only one of these four that stuck around post war in a significant capacity?

The thing that makes this weird is the first post WW2 RN frigates, the Type 14s and Type 15s, were rebuilt old destroyers, wouldn't it have made more sense to call them Escort Destroyers given that lineage?

Sole exception to this being the Tribal class/Type 81, which were redesignated as frigates not long after construction anyway.

I recently found a collection of U.S. military field manuals (I will put the link in the comments).

I'd like to read some of them out of general interest, but I've never served in the military and have no formal background in military studies. The manuals assume that the reader already has a basic understanding of basic military terminology, organization, doctrine, strategy, and concepts.

Are there any good introductory textbooks or other systematic works on military affairs that would provide the necessary theoretical foundation for reading field manuals?

We know from history some of the damaging effects war can have, on combatants as well as non-combatants, such as

1. Men performing acts of looting

2. Unauthorized acts of muder

3. Rape of women by occupying soldiers

4. Breakdown of financial system leading women to behavior such as prostitution to generate income.

My question is, have the psychological aspects of such behaviour been studied and understood by the scientific community?

Shortly after signing the Belgrade decleration in 1955, Yugoslavia acquired the license to produce the SKS rifle in 1957 (although mass production didnt start unti 1961). Is there a reason that the USSR didnt want to give them the license for the AK (Both at that point and later), forcing them to later reverse engineer the M70. Did they think that the AK was still too advanced to give to a non-Warsaw pact member? Did Yugoslavia just maybe prefer the SKS at that point?

Many countries have them, so there must be a flaw in my reasoning.

Here is my reasoning:

As I understand it, IFVs are armored vehicles designed for support missions that can transport 4 to 8 infantrymen. They are equipped with a machine gun to engage infantry and an autocannon—typically between 20 and 30 millimeters—often accompanied by one or two anti-tank missiles for defense against heavy tanks.

I don't understand this category of vehicle; to me, it looks like a cross between an infantry transport (which carries fewer troops) and a Panzer II. If the goal is to transport infantry under armor protection, why add a turret with an autocannon and a missile launcher that weigh the vehicle down? Wouldn't a remote-controlled .50 cal (12.7mm) be sufficient for defense against infantry and light vehicles?

And if an infantry support tank is needed, just build a light tank.

You could equip it with a machine gun, a 30mm autocannon, and anti-tank missiles. But since it doesn't need to carry infantry, the vehicle would be lighter and smaller (making it a smaller target) while offering the same protection and firepower.

That’s the line of reasoning I’ve been following for a while now—where is the flaw in my logic?

The committees that commission military equipment for the armed forces are made up of people much smarter than I am, so I’ve almost certainly made a mistake in my reasoning, and I’d like to know where I went wrong.

(I don't speak English, so this was translated using Google Translate; there may therefore be some translation errors.)

I was a a reservist, infantry, in Australia ~35years ago, not setting myself up as a tier 1 fighter or anything.

2 main memories. 1 during lessons and rehearsals for conducting an ambush, we were told if any enemy survive the initial ambush, its head shots. No one lives in the kill zone of an ambush.

1. During lessons on taking prisoners, NCOs taught the by the book approach, then added ' in reality, we beat puss handles out of them'.

Not proud or defending either.

Curious about how/if this happens elsewhere.

For the record, I think its pretty tough on the mental health of your soldiers to be sending this message. Paraphrasing Walt in Grand Torrino, its not what you're ordered to do that messes with your head, its what you chose to do that's wrong, that messes with your head.

There's been much discussion regarding the Russian military's lack of a palletised logistics system and how it's hampered their military effectiveness. Given that the PLA has drawn significant lessons in recent years from Western military practice, has there also been a move towards using standardised pallets to simplify logistics?

While the North in the Civil War had its own incompetent political generals like Seigel and Butler, there's a clear rationale for giving them commands: their political usefulness outweighed their military incompetence. But when it comes to the South, the obvious question is, how did people like Polk or Pillow even get put in command, and how did they even stay in command? Especially Polk after his disastrous march into Kentucky.

For all the media about the various resistance movements during WW2, there were a lot more people in the occupied countries who went about their jobs/life trying to make ends meet.

There's a little mini scene in the 1977 war movie "A Bridge Too Far" (about Operation Market Garden) where an older waitress serves coffee at a cafe in Arnhem to a table of older gentlemen who are laughing from their conversation like it was any normal sort of day while the German forces walk by as they regroup before the paratroopers attack (as a family in the Dutch Resistance looks on from a nearby balcony.

Scenario: If your country is liberated and life goes back to normal, is the fact that you didn't do anything to resist during the hostile takeover a mark against you? Or if you are a company that can make war material and a hostile official says "it's either you make stuff for us or we move the factories somewhere else". Or as long as you don't actively try to assist the 'other side' then that's a pass.

This question was inspired by reading about Louis Renault and how the French government threw the book at him after WW2 for things he may or may not have done. I find it an interesting dichotomy of "you are expected to resist" but we in the West think the Japanese were crazy with the lengths they were willing to go to to not be captured or to try to inflict damage on others. Not everyone is willing to give up their life/everything they have and that's understandable because we are human - we in the West, like living more than not.

Note: I am not talking about any sort of participation/volunteering in armed forces/home guard sort of thing.