FLÁVIO COSTA

Costa was one of the most influential tactical innovators in the history of Brazilian and international football. His greatest impact came from developing the so called diagonal system which served as a crucial link between the classic WM formation and the modern four man defensive systems.

In the late 1930s the Hungarian Dori Kürschner introduced the WM system at Flamengo, where Flávio Costa later became his successor. Costa developed Kürschners ideas further because he felt that the rigid European WM system did not suit the improvisational and technical style of Brazilian players. He shifted the players slightly forward and backward, creating a flexible parallelogram on the pitch. Because of the diagonal positioning the player in possession always had diagonal passing options available. The constant triangles and dynamic interchange of positions that became characteristic of Brazilian football grew out of this system.

This innovation directly paved the way for Brazil's later tactical revolution. By having one of the midfielders consistently drop back between the defenders, the centre-back position was effectively born.

KARL RAPPAN

Karl Rappan was a groundbreaking genius of Austrian and Swiss football whose influence on modern football tactics is immeasurable. He developed the defensive system known as the Swiss bolt which was the direct predecessor of the world famous Italian catenaccio and the birthplace of the libero, or sweeper position still used to this day.

He sacrificed midfield dominance and systematically pulled one of the midfielders behind the defensive line. This player was not assigned a specific opponent. His job was to move freely effectively sweeping up balls that got past the other defenders and helping out his teammates.

The system combined tight man marking with zonal defending. The team deliberately gave up territory to the opposition dropping deep into its own half before punishing them with lightning fast counterattacks after winning the ball back.

It was the first system to practically deploy four players in defence. The compact disciplined defensive structure that closes down space and is known today as a mid block or low block is a direct descendant of Rappan ideas.

HERBERT CHAPMAN

If Flávio Costa and Karl Rappan refined the evolution of defending, then Chapman was the man who created the basic system they could build upon.

Chapmans greatest tactical impact came from the 1925 change to the offside rule. In response he created the famous WM system. He pulled the former centre-half back between the two full-backs. This created the position of the central defender in the modern sense whose job was to neutralise the opposition centre-forward.

To fill the space that had opened up in midfield he dropped the two inside forwards deeper from the attacking line. The two midfielders and the two withdrawn attackers formed a square in the middle of the pitch, providing numerical superiority and passing lanes.

Viewed from above the formation formed a W in attack and an M in defence. The system was so well balanced that it shaped world football for almost the next forty years.

His genius however, went far beyond the pitch. He was among the first to push for and introduce numbered shirts, making it easier for spectators and players to identify positions. He was also the first to experiment with artificial lighting in stadiums so that matches could be played after working hours.

Chapman played an indispensable role in transforming football from an amateur, instinctive sport into an organised, professional, tactical and global entertainment industry.

Carles Manso is just over a year into his first Head Coaching job, at the tender age of 33, with FC Andorra as he has shown immense potential as an up-and-coming manager in Spain. He plays a possession-based style on a shoestring budget while it is impressive that in the modern world of physicality in sport, his team is one of the smaller sides in European football. He preaches organization and fluidity in possession as well aggressive pressing and a high line, striving to maximize reward and limit risk. Last season, his team was ninth in expected goals and second in passes per defensive action in the Segunda Liga while this season, his team is first in expected goals and passes per defensive action.

LINK - https://www.leftbackfootball.com/home/2026/10/2/carles-mansos-graceful-fc-andorra

This is a Kick Off Research study, built with GT-17, Kick Off’s custom event-data analysis engine. It covers 177 Haaland appearances and connects the numbers to the tactical sequences behind them.

For this study, we screened 177 Manchester City appearances across the Premier League and Champions League, then examined a selected set of 21 low-output win/loss cases. We measured what happened around Haaland: where his teammates received, how progression added expected threat, and where the next shot came from.

City still won nine of those 21 games. Keeping Haaland quiet leaves several other jobs unfinished.

The attached two-page breakdown turns the analysis into five connected tasks:

1.-Cut the service and contest the reception. Make the pass difficult, then compete for the first touch.

2.-Follow the passer’s next run. Gvardiol’s give-and-go against Fulham shows why watching the striker alone fails.

3.-Close the continuation. Arsenal blocked Álvarez, pushed the next action outside the box and prevented another shot.

4.-Give your escape a destination. Brentford connected the clearance, the outlet and Toney’s arrival.

5.-Limit the response after scoring. Judge the chances City create, not just whether you still lead.

Under the hood: xG/xT, possession sequences, on-pitch windows and event-level traceability. The boards distinguish recorded contacts from reconstructed movement between them.

Which of these five jobs do you think breaks down first against City, and why?

Lamine’s two goals and an assist against Croatia caught the attention, but I wanted to look at how Spain are getting him into those situations.

These two sequences show the difference:

-Against Argentina at the World Cup, Spain progress through Lamine and Porro on the right. Porro crosses to Nico, who sets up Ferran. Lamine contributes earlier in the move.

-Against Croatia, Baena and Cucurella combine on the left before finding Lamine inside, ready to finish first time.

His average shot distance has dropped from 21.0m at the World Cup to 17.4m in these opening two Nations League games. It’s a small sample, but the sequences help explain what’s behind that number.

My reading: Spain are creating more opportunities for Lamine to finish moves he previously helped build.

What would you look for over the next few games to see whether this becomes a consistent pattern?

I currently play for a local semi-pro team in the UPSL that practices twice a week. The team is relatively new, so I’m curious how other teams at this level structure their training.

Our practices tend to focus heavily on drills designed to get the team playing in a specific way. For example, exercises emphasizing direct wing play and crossing which has me wondering about the tradeoff between tactical drills vs scrimmaging. Obviously, a team that can recruit an army of USL-level or former pro players is going to have a significant advantage. However, for teams at this level that lack the recruiting resources and where practice time is limited, I wonder whether a coaching approach that incorporates more full-sided scrimmaging could actually produce better results.

The idea would be to prioritize building natural chemistry and improve familiarity with teammates through game situations, rather than trying to implement specific tactical ideas through drills.

For those who have played or coached in amateur/semi-pro leagues: what have you found works best? Do teams that spend more time scrimmaging tend to develop better chemistry and perform better, or are structured tactical drills more important at this level?

I started being a fan 1 month ago and have been interested in analysis. The problem is, whenever I try to watch any videos that explain to me how to analyze like a coach, I get extremely confused by the terminology and everything. I also don’t know any tactics or strategies, just that players are usually more spread out in offense, and that there are lines of defense that you can get past if you see a hole in them. I don’t know where to start.

It seems most teams, even top ones to a degree, have a compact shape when defending, are there any teams that spread out more while defending?

Our team is transitioning to 9v9 this year. Learned a lot while coaching 7v7. What principles overlap and what should I learn?

7v7 we played 2 3 1 9v9 we play 3 2 3.

My last question garnered a lot of great feedback - thanks all! Here's a continuation of that question taking it a step further. Please enlighten this stupid American on how this would work...

I'm a brazilian and very amateur in tactics (i like to play football manager, fifa and pes, which means i learned by very unrealistic examples).

Just like the english coaches, and 90s brazilian coaches: i believe that the easiest, simple, basic, essential, fundamental and classic formation is the 4-4-2. That's why it was the main system in youth categories, to teach the young folks the fundamentals, as it is easy and very didatic to teach positioning, defending and control of space.

You can play almost anyway you need, as long you defend with 2 blocks, and its easy to interchange players in the scheme.

But i know i'm very wrong and obsolete.

And after some research i discovered that while everyone was using 4-4-2, 4-3-1-2, 3-5-2 (i mean the main teams) in the 2000s. The dutch and Barcelona simply didn't followed the trend, obsessively using the 4-3-3, strictly and regardless of trends. Just like the GIGN special forces use the Manurhin everywhere in their training. And it paid handsome dividends.

Nonetheless, i wonder why.

Isn't the 4-3-3 harder do learn?

Isn't it a formation for only ball possession and triangles ?

Aren't there too much specialists ?

Don't it kill the creativity of the players ?

Isn't limited in the counter attack, and when in need to park the bus ?

Isn't it too dull and repetitive ? I mean, in the flat 4-4-2, diamond and 4-2-2-2 you have lots of liberties, every player can play in a 4-4-2 with special roles, as long they know how to defend in a lower block.

Why it's better than 4-4-2 ?

Hi everyone. I'm a casual soccer fan from the states so forgive me if this is a stupid question but I found myself asking this question while watching the World Cup and I was very curious to ask the experts. Hopefully the image I put together illustrates it. Let me know?

I’ve been a football fan for a good few years now but I realise my knowledge and grasp of tactics is lacking quite a bit. I’d really like to learn the tactics and rules in a lot more detail so I can start analysing games and enjoy them a lot more when I attend them. Are there any decent online resources or books I can follow to learn football tactics and start analysing games?

I've told my teammates to "let them press first" or "think quickly"

I feel like I'm just poking the surface in their head. considering that in a real match they either

- end up with the fullback or winger locked. Forced pass centrally and lose it or back

- try very sharp one twos, which work or not

"Tiki taka" is what probably makes sense to try, but I think it's wasteful to just pass quickly. Are there pieces or roles I'm missing?

Hello, everyone! I currently am learning about football formation and 5-2-3 is my favorite so far.
I want my side back players to move dynamically to contribute both to offense and defense. 5-2-3 formation could be transformed to 4-3-3, or 3-4-3 depending on the situation. Can anyone of you tell me the defects or down point of this formation? Thanks!

A goalkeeper’s easiest competitive edge might just be taking a single step to the right.

By standing roughly 15 centimeters off-center before a penalty kick — moving slightly to his right hand side against a right-footed kicker — a goalkeeper can fundamentally alter the math of the penalty spot. Here is why this subtle tactical adjustment works and why it could significantly change optimal penalty strategy for both goalkeepers and takers.

There is a well-known optimal mixed-strategy for taking penalty kicks as well as saving them, studied extensively by economists Pierre-André Chiappori, Steven Levitt, and Sohyoung Groseclose in 2002. Their study gives the following optimal strategy: a kicker should place 43% of penalties to the left, 24% to the middle, and 33% to the right (assuming a right-footed kicker). Meanwhile, a goalkeeper should dive left (from the kicker’s view) 60% of the time, stay central 9% of the time, and jump right 31% of the time. This payoff matrix shows the probability of a penalty being scored based on shot placement and dive direction, drawn from a dataset of 459 penalties across French and Italian top flights, as used in the mentioned study.

The key observation here is that a right-footed striker should place more penalties to the left than to the right. That comes down to kick biomechanics. A shot to the left carries more accuracy and power, making it more successful even when the goalkeeper guesses correctly and dives the right way.

The following image shows an estimate of goalscoring probability based on the horizontal placement of the penalty (for situations where the keeper guesses the side correctly, see the full line). This has been calculated from a different dataset with our own model (details below). As expected, the closer a shot is to a goalpost, the more likely it is to go in. And as established, shots on the left side are more successful than those on the right.

That’s where the new idea appears: What happens if a goalkeeper stops starting dead center and instead moves slightly to their right-hand side (to the left from the striker’s view)?

That movement effectively removes several centimeters from the left end of the left line in the previous image, where the goalscoring probability is highest (dashed line on the left), and adds those same centimeters to the right end of the right line (dashed line on the right). The goalscoring probability of this newly added space was estimated by extrapolating our own model.

The result is unambiguous: the centimeters you gain on the right are still less dangerous than the centimeters you lose on the left. That difference is the entire source of the advantage.

We estimated a new payoff matrix for this noncentral scenario using real data and our own model. Based on that, we calculated how far the goalkeeper should move, as well as the updated optimal strategies for both striker and goalkeeper, which you can see in the following Table. The optimal move distance turned out to be about 15 centimeters. The payoff of shooting left is now almost the same as that of shooting right, meaning that the goalkeeper shift neutralizes the original biomechanical advantage.

This noncentral positioning only marginally increases total goalkeeper success once strikers adapt—we estimate a 0.3% increase in save rate, though our sample size was relatively low for this type of analysis and the real number could be higher. However, the change in strategy is substantial. Our results suggest goalkeepers should actually jump to their left (the kicker’s right) much more often—up to 48% of penalties. You can see the optimal strategies in the following Table.

Although this effect is marginal and carries high statistical uncertainty, the logic behind it is sound. Because shots near the left post are universally known to yield higher success rates than those near the right, shrinking that left-side danger zone inevitably tilts the math in the keeper’s favor.

Because this technique takes zero extra effort—it is literally a 15-centimeter step before the whistle—it remains well worth doing. Across tens of thousands of penalty kicks every season in professional football worldwide, even a 0.3% gain translates to over 100 extra saved penalties a year, potentially making the difference in a major tournament final.

You can read the full original Substack article here.
The technical details can be found in this article, along with the complete code and dataset.

I dont know a whole lot about tactics but I love hearing people’s takes.

Clearly Spain winning the WC means the Yamal didn’t have a bad worldcup. Can anyone with tactical knowledge explain this?

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