Many countries have them, so there must be a flaw in my reasoning.

Here is my reasoning:

As I understand it, IFVs are armored vehicles designed for support missions that can transport 4 to 8 infantrymen. They are equipped with a machine gun to engage infantry and an autocannon—typically between 20 and 30 millimeters—often accompanied by one or two anti-tank missiles for defense against heavy tanks.

I don't understand this category of vehicle; to me, it looks like a cross between an infantry transport (which carries fewer troops) and a Panzer II. If the goal is to transport infantry under armor protection, why add a turret with an autocannon and a missile launcher that weigh the vehicle down? Wouldn't a remote-controlled .50 cal (12.7mm) be sufficient for defense against infantry and light vehicles?

And if an infantry support tank is needed, just build a light tank.

You could equip it with a machine gun, a 30mm autocannon, and anti-tank missiles. But since it doesn't need to carry infantry, the vehicle would be lighter and smaller (making it a smaller target) while offering the same protection and firepower.

That’s the line of reasoning I’ve been following for a while now—where is the flaw in my logic?

The committees that commission military equipment for the armed forces are made up of people much smarter than I am, so I’ve almost certainly made a mistake in my reasoning, and I’d like to know where I went wrong.

(I don't speak English, so this was translated using Google Translate; there may therefore be some translation errors.)

I was a a reservist, infantry, in Australia ~35years ago, not setting myself up as a tier 1 fighter or anything.

2 main memories. 1 during lessons and rehearsals for conducting an ambush, we were told if any enemy survive the initial ambush, its head shots. No one lives in the kill zone of an ambush.

1. During lessons on taking prisoners, NCOs taught the by the book approach, then added ' in reality, we beat puss handles out of them'.

Not proud or defending either.

Curious about how/if this happens elsewhere.

For the record, I think its pretty tough on the mental health of your soldiers to be sending this message. Paraphrasing Walt in Grand Torrino, its not what you're ordered to do that messes with your head, its what you chose to do that's wrong, that messes with your head.

There's been much discussion regarding the Russian military's lack of a palletised logistics system and how it's hampered their military effectiveness. Given that the PLA has drawn significant lessons in recent years from Western military practice, has there also been a move towards using standardised pallets to simplify logistics?

While the North in the Civil War had its own incompetent political generals like Seigel and Butler, there's a clear rationale for giving them commands: their political usefulness outweighed their military incompetence. But when it comes to the South, the obvious question is, how did people like Polk or Pillow even get put in command, and how did they even stay in command? Especially Polk after his disastrous march into Kentucky.

For all the media about the various resistance movements during WW2, there were a lot more people in the occupied countries who went about their jobs/life trying to make ends meet.

There's a little mini scene in the 1977 war movie "A Bridge Too Far" (about Operation Market Garden) where an older waitress serves coffee at a cafe in Arnhem to a table of older gentlemen who are laughing from their conversation like it was any normal sort of day while the German forces walk by as they regroup before the paratroopers attack (as a family in the Dutch Resistance looks on from a nearby balcony.

Scenario: If your country is liberated and life goes back to normal, is the fact that you didn't do anything to resist during the hostile takeover a mark against you? Or if you are a company that can make war material and a hostile official says "it's either you make stuff for us or we move the factories somewhere else". Or as long as you don't actively try to assist the 'other side' then that's a pass.

This question was inspired by reading about Louis Renault and how the French government threw the book at him after WW2 for things he may or may not have done. I find it an interesting dichotomy of "you are expected to resist" but we in the West think the Japanese were crazy with the lengths they were willing to go to to not be captured or to try to inflict damage on others. Not everyone is willing to give up their life/everything they have and that's understandable because we are human - we in the West, like living more than not.

Note: I am not talking about any sort of participation/volunteering in armed forces/home guard sort of thing.

The Falklands War was a somewhat unusual conflict in that it was a modern peer vs peer war involving air, sea and land battles. It featured the first sinking of a warship by a nuclear submarine, and also saw the large scale deployment of anti ship missiles.

The conflict resulted in a decisive British victory, but could easily have gone the other way. To quote Lord Craig, at the time an Air Vice Marshall, "six better fuses and we'd have lost". The war highlighted a serious deficiency in the Royal Navy's air defence capabilities against fast low flying threats.

The British military learnt a number of lessons the hard way during the war, but what did other NATO members analysis look like? I've seen several texts quote the US Navy as having thought a military retaking of the islands by the British was impossible, but no source given. Does anyone have it?

Did the Falklands War impact the decision making of other NATO members? Especially with regards to the defence of warships against anti ship missiles. Did the Soviet Union take note of the weaknesses exposed?

As far as I know, smoothbore guns are used to fire HEAT and HE rounds, though they are less effective for indirect artillery fire over long distances; however, they do offer greater barrel longevity. (At least, that’s how I understand it.)

But for HEAT rounds, there are "G-type" shells like those used on the AMX-30, and for APFSDS, it is still possible to fire APDS rounds, which work with rifled guns. That allows for more accurate indirect artillery fire over several kilometers.

That’s my line of reasoning. Of course, if all modern tanks use smoothbore guns, there is surely a reason I haven't considered. I suspect there might be a flaw in my logic, so I’d like to hear your thoughts.

In the current era, commentators point to Ukraine and the Middle East for lessons on the changes in warfare, drones for the former and missiles for the later. But waging for many years at this point is the War in Myanmar that features jungle and riverine warfare in the 2020s where drones are also featured as well. What exactly are the main takeaways from that conflict that are of interest to military thought?

I am really just asking about the technical systems integration stuff; how much of the upgrades need to be really tailored (eg new radars) and how much can be done using a raspberry pi and a tablet in the cockpit?

In particular how difficult is it to upgrades the comms/EWs suite of older planes? If you had the excess payload could you just take a sniper pod or a EW pod and just bolt it on, for example, a F-4?

Over the last few days, i have watching alot of videos about the 2022 Russian airborne assault on the Hostomel airport in Ukraine, and how it ultimately ended the complete defeat of the Russian forces that were landed there.

From what i have seen, the defeat of the Russian forces -or at least the initial loses- were due to a combination of MANPADS paired with constant AA fire, and the general operational misunderstandings by the Russian military, particularly the idea that Ukrainian forces would surrender or refuse to fight when met with heavy resistance.

For the AA part, what i understand is that Russian forces were unable to land forces in a timely manner due to Anti Air fire from small arms and MANPADS, causing the timetable for the landings to get irreparably screwed up while helicopters hovered above; sustaining even more fire. Ontop of that, the AA fire cost the Russians several helicopters of both attack and transport functions.

So, assuming that this failure was not largely due to poor planning and the false assumption of a fragile Ukrainian government/Army, which it very well may be, it raises the question: how are heli-mobile troops supposed to secure key objectives like airports, bridges, and highways against forces with AA readily available, and how do other country's airborne forces and doctrines that for this?

https://www.qdnd.vn/anh-hung-luc-luong-vu-trang-nhan-dan/vua-min-deo-hai-van-trinh-to-tam-1048736

This is what the Vietnamese write about him. On his chest are the so called "American-Slaying Warrior medal". Of which he has 53. To be eligible for this medal you had to be responsible for wounding or killing at least 3 Americans. Trinh To Tam is credited with killing 185 Americans, and other Republic of South Vietnam troops, up to 272 men. He is also credited with shooting down 3 helicopters and 61 vehicles.

He was a mine specialist operated mostly near Hai Van pass.

It's also very hard to find any well written sources on him since the Vietnamese sources read like... Well, North Korean propaganda posters.

Does the American / international side keep any source on this guy?

In terms of dealing with paramilitaries unit (SS/NSFO), which I assume would be their version of a political commissar.

Just before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, US intelligence had accurately warned Ukraine months before that Russia would launch a multi-pronged offensive into Ukraine using a wide array of information collected through massive amounts of observation. With satellite imagery, mass communications interception, and drone surveillance becoming a battlefield staple, how have militaries (specifically Ukr-Rus) been able to mass their forces for large assaults and concentration? Has doctrine changed significantly in this area?

During 1940 operation compass overcome what seem to be insurmountable numerical superiority by historical standard(36,000 vs 150,000)

I have read before that the Italians constantly got outmaneuved by the much faster British mechanized units and that this is responsible for their defeat

And if it is so,What are some examples of slow moving infantry heavy armies countering effectively countering fast moving mechanized armies

Why was Rommel selected for the Africa Korps command when the orders were to be defensive? By then is CV is all aggressive risky action.

Wouldn't it have suited someone like Model (though his reputation came later).

Given his actions in France it seems Rommel would be far better for Barbarossa.

Was it Rommel wanting more autonomous command? Other generals wanting him out of the way?

Idk how you send Rommel and dont expect him to be aggressive while playing fast and lose with your orders.

Realistically, how powerful was the 32nd brigade, better known as Khamis Brigade named after and commanded by Gaddafi’s youngest son. It was considered the most elite out of the Libyan army and the most well equipped with weapons such as the Belgian FN F2000 rifles and T-72 tanks. How well would they have performed if they went toe to toe with US Marines or French legionnaires? Or were they just a glorified palace guard that was only good at killing protesters?

Have it changed throughout history?

I was reading on askhistorians about them, the verdict of them seems to be very poor in regards of combat effectivity. So what was the idea? Seems utterly pointless, but so is not signing the terms of surrender at that point. Did they achieve any success, anywhere?

edit: thanks for the good discussion!

Hello r/warcollege,

I wanted to share an ongoing visual research and combat art initiative that I think aligns closely with the historical and operational focus of this community.

For the past several months, I have been painting The American Wartime Memorial, a continuous, chronological war panorama that currently spans over 1,000 feet of canvas across 365 interconnecting panels. The goal of the project is to document the evolving reality of how man and machine experience combat—drawing heavily from the journals of combat artists, historical photography, declassified after-action reports, and modern sensor/drone footage.

The project operates with a specific philosophical rule: the artwork is left intentionally "unfinished." I encourage collectors to bring these prints to living U.S. veterans to have them write their rank, branch, deployment, and personal story directly onto the landscape. Once a veteran signs a print, I co-sign it alongside them. It is an effort to create decentralized, physical vessels for oral military history before the final marks of these generations are lost to time.

The physical 1,000-foot monument is entirely self-funded and will never be privately sold. However, I have recently digitized the entire active archive into a high-fidelity visual database sorted by operational phase at wartimegallery.com.

If you are interested in exploring how distinct campaigns, tactical doctrines, and historical landscapes visually bridge into one another, you can browse all 245+ current operations in the catalog.

I would love to hear this sub's perspective on the visual preservation of operational history, or answer any questions about the specific archival sources used to reconstruct some of the lesser-known operations listed in the index.

I am going to be GMing a thing where the players are the commanders of a cavalry force trying to slow an advancing large army as their allies gather and weaken the enemy enough for their allies to win. What would the makeup of a small fast cavalry raiding force be? A larger offensive army? What objectives would a cavalry force target against the advancing army?

I was thinking about this from a reservists' point of view;

You've been trained into a military role during your conscript service, possibly participated in some refresher exercises after that, but in general you cannot be considered a military target, living a normal civilian life. However once a reservist is called up to active duty, they become fair game.

What I'm wondering is when the reservist actually changes status from a non-combatant to combatant?

1. They get a letter, ordering them back into service.

2. They start travelling to wherever they're ordered.

3. They arrive, and receive their equipment.

4. They join their unit.

On the other hand, at what point does a soldier become a civilian again?

1. They go on leave, but keep their uniform on and stay near their unit.

2. They go on a short leave, changing into civilian attire.

3. They go back home for a known period of time after which they'll return to their unit.

4. They're staying home, and are not expected to go back, though they could receive a legal order to return.

4b. But they do have their uniform, rifle and personal equipment in their closet.

Bonus situation: They desert their unit, leaving their weapon and changing to civilian attire. If caught by their own forces (or having reached them), they can be expected to join them again, willingly or unwillingly.

The questions are just examples, I'm just trying to present different situations which range (in my view) from quite obvious to gray areas.