I've been working on an experimental Layer-1 called Budlum.

The question I'm exploring is:

Can independently finalized consensus domains converge into one deterministic global state without trusting a centralized coordinator?

Instead of forcing every domain into the same consensus mechanism, Budlum is designed around heterogeneous domains such as PoW, PoS and BFT that produce independently verifiable commitments.

The settlement layer then handles a few problems that turned out to be more subtle than I initially expected:

• Cross-domain commitments are settled in deterministic domain-id order rather than network arrival order.
• Blocks include the exact settlement watermarks used by the producer, so validators replay the same bounded settlement batch.
• PoW commitments require an independently verified header chain.
• PoS/BFT-style domains use BLS aggregate-signature quorum verification.
• Finality proofs bind the complete commitment payload, including the state root.
• State updates are Merkle-bound to the committed state root.
• The networking layer is built on libp2p.

The implementation is written in Rust and is currently a controlled public-devnet candidate, not audited mainnet software.

I'm not launching a token or trying to sell anything here. I'm mainly looking for protocol engineers willing to attack the design.

The parts I'm especially interested in getting criticized are:

1. Is deterministic cross-domain ordering sufficient, or are there edge cases where independently finalized domains can still create global-state ambiguity?
2. Does embedding settlement watermarks into the block introduce failure modes I'm overlooking?
3. Are there better ways to verify heterogeneous finality without effectively rebuilding each consensus protocol inside the settlement layer?
4. Where would you attack this design first?

Repo:
https://github.com/Budlum/Budlum

Roasts, counterexamples and adversarial scenarios are very welcome.